Some Corporate Governance specifications in economies in transition by Mustafa, Saxhide
                                                                                                   Thesis, no.1, 2018     89 
Some Corporate Governance specifications in 
economies in transition  
Saxhide Mustafa 
Abstract 
According to the principles and standards of market economies 
and based on OECD principles, Corporate Governance should 
ensure the growth of the value of companies' assets. Besides, it 
should provide a balanced representation of stakeholders' 
interests, first of all, to owners, management, and employees. 
One of the key problems that newly created private enterprises 
and enterprises created through privatization is their 
incorporation or the creation of modern corporate governance 
structures which, as discussed in this paper, are of primary 
importance for the growth of these companies, for their 
sustainability, for access to capital and for their investment 
attractiveness. Achieving these standards in transition 
economies is proving to be quite problematic, especially in the 
Eastern and Southeast Europe. Theoretical discussions and 
empirical research largely conclude that the problems are not so 
much associated with the legal framework as much as they are 
concerned with their implementation, especially with the 
institutional environment and the problems that these countries 
have with law enforcement and corruption. This paper 
provides an overview of theoretical discussions on specific 
corporate governance issues in these countries and then based 
on the secondary resources and empirical studies in Kosovo's 
case, a brief comparative analysis of developments in this area 
in Croatia, Bulgaria, and Kosovo. The conclusions drawn from 
this analysis appear to be in line with theoretical discussions.    
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Theoretical Discussions 
 
Transition economies faced, and some still face the challenges 
of transforming the economic system to serve the needs of an 
open market economy able to cope with competition and meet 
the social and economic needs of these societies. The 
privatization of state-owned enterprises, the development of 
private enterprises created after the collapse of the socialist 
system in Central and Eastern Europe, more specifically 
consolidation of a competitive private sector constitutes the key 
factor in the economic development of these countries and for 
the building of democracy.  One of the key problems that newly 
created enterprises and enterprises created through 
privatization face is their incorporation or the creation of 
modern corporate governance structures which, as discussed in 
this paper, are of primary importance to the growth of these 
companies, their sustainability, for access to capital and their 
investment attractiveness. 
While, for example, Central European countries have made 
significant achievements in implementing the OECD principles 
for corporate governance the same cannot be said for the East 
and Southeast Europe countries. Another important issue in 
these societies is also the governance of public or state 
enterprises. Weaknesses that followed the privatization process 
regarding concentrated ownership and deformations in the 
form of oligarchs have made it difficult to build a significant 
structure in corporate governance. A system based on the 
reciprocal relations of the new class of owners with political 
structures is also reflected in the way corporations are 
governed and how they function, governance structures, 
decision-making processes, whereby the transparency and 
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accountability suffer the most, the role of the interested actors, 
social responsibility, and ethical principles. 
In the construction of commercial laws as well as the 
institutional and legal framework for corporate governance, the 
technical assistance had more impact than the previous or 
inherited legal framework (Pistor et al., 2000). Majority of 
Central European countries have approved the Continental 
model, while Eastern and Southeast European countries have 
implemented both models with the Anglo-Saxon model 
dominating. 
The process of reforming and shifting from the planned 
economy to a market economy can be seen in three stages: 1) 
the time when the old ownership structure and the old system 
still dominate (2) the time when the new institutional system is 
established, but still the elements of the old system are still 
present and (3) dominance of institutions and practices 
characteristic of an open market economy (North, 1991). 
Meanwhile, few other authors consider this process in two 
phases: (1) Marketization shock and re-structuring and (2) deep 
privatization and restructuring (Carlin, 2003). 
The shock triggered by the introduction of price 
liberalization and the dismantling of the planned and 
centralized economy apparatus goes through the problems of 
the economic downturn, rising unemployment, the emergence 
of private initiative and the establishment of macroeconomic 
and fiscal stability. At this stage, despite all the problems, there 
is a link between performance and access to capital, the 
emergence of bankrupting firms and the creation of the private 
sector. In this context, it also begins some type of 
reorganization of enterprises, as they have to take measures to 
survive despite the lack of incentives and subsidies offered by 
the state. Depending on the conditions and the given context in 
some countries, this stage has been shorter (Central Europe and 
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the Baltic countries), whereas in the case of the Soviet Union 
and some of the East and Southeastern Europe countries it has 
been accompanied by a chaotic state, disorientation and total 
passivation of the former state enterprise sector. The second 
phase of privatization and deep restructuring is related to the 
engagement of governance and management structures in 
enterprises to take on the responsibility to operate on the 
critical point of profitability and to ensure efficient growth and 
a profitable firm (Carlin, 2003). In this regard, the form of 
ownership that derives from external privatization or from 
internal privatization with MBO (Purchasing state companies 
from their management) and EBO (buying state companies 
from employees) has been seen more important for relations in 
the governing structure of the corporation. It is considered that 
external privatization has been more effective in controlling 
managers. Also, the lack of capital markets and the lack of 
transparent and standard financial reporting systems have 
favored concentrated ownership. Besides, foreign owners 
(foreign investors) were considered to be oriented towards 
profitability.  
Then the manager-dominated ownership is considered more 
profitable than the dominated ownership of workers when it 
comes to internal privatization. In general, the basic 
privatization methods that had to do with mass privatization 
(distribution of free shares, voucher etc.) that has produced a 
distributed ownership and privatization with the sale of assets 
to internal and external private investors which has produced a 
more concentrated ownership. Estimates are that the companies 
which after privatization have resulted in more concentrated 
ownership have been the most prone to quick restructuring 
(Marcincin & Wijnbergen, 1997). 
However, to see the effects of transition on corporate 
governance it is important to see the impact of ownership 
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change and the impact of the ownership structure on the 
behavior of certain companies. Nevertheless, arrangements and 
corporate governance structures of privatized companies and 
those established as private companies have remained out of 
theoretical or empirical research for quite some time. This is 
certainly about creating effective governance structures and 
institutional frameworks that ensure transparency and sound 
financial reporting, bankruptcy proceedings, also a legal 
framework that protects investors and owners, provide a 
balance of interests among stakeholders, and addresses the 
issue of ‘disciplining of managers. It is considered that success 
in building an effective corporate governance framework in 
countries transition is important not only for the performance 
of companies but also for their competitive capacities, their 
report on internationalization and their state relationship 
(Estrin, 2002). 
Initial various conditions at the beginning of the transition 
and different methods and privatization policies, economic 
policies, including the legal and institutional framework have 
had their impact also in the modernization of the corporate 
governance process in few certain countries. Thus, the 
governments of Central European countries, the Baltic 
countries and some of the former Yugoslav states (primarily 
Slovenia and Croatia) have been selected on legitimate terms of 
free elections, based largely on the success of the reforms, 
which was not the case, for instance with Russia, other 
countries emerging from the former Soviet Union and most 
Southeast European countries (Esterin, 2002).  Bead on the 
characteristics of transition in Albania and the delayed 
transition, for well-known reasons, in Kosovo, both economies 
share more features with the second group. The 
aforementioned context and the earliest involvement of the first 
group countries in the EU integration processes have been 
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reflected, among other things, with a better success in 
enterprise restructuring, their performance and the more 
successful implementation of corporate governance. One of the 
important issues related to the specifics of corporate 
governance in transition economies is certainly related to the 
fragile democratic institutions that lack the capacity or 
willingness of party elites in those governments to enforce the 
law. (Crotty & Jobome, 2004). This then creates a turbulent 
business environment for business, where the implementation 
of business contracts faces inefficient and politically influenced 
judicial system. Under these conditions, one of the main 
problems is the protection of investors, namely the investment 
environment, which does not have enough incentives to 
implement corporate governance standards. In this situation, in 
the countries that used shock therapies in hopes that sudden 
change of ownership will induce a transfer of market economy 
institutions, including the development of corporate 
governance based on the theory and institution experience of 
the "agency" did not prove successful in most Southeastern and 
Eastern European countries (Crotty & Jobomem, 2004). Stiglitz, 
(1999) argues that the aspects of corporate governance in these 
countries were underestimated for a long time. In fact, it turned 
out that privatization and accompanying reforms were 
unsuccessful in countries characterized with poor institutions 
with low capacity and readiness for law enforcement which 
was manifested with high corruption and high informality.  So 
there are also opinions that the sequence should have been 
perhaps strengthening the institutions first and then privatizing 
next. It is considered that this sequence (privatization in the 
conditions of fragile and weak institutions) also created a 
vacuum in terms of corporate governance (Crotty & Jobomem, 
2004). This has even stimulated the behavior of those who have 
acquired controllable ownership blocks to take control of public 
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rent as a result of a ‘destructive restructuring (Black et al., 
2000). The genesis of this destructive restructuring lays at 
manipulated privatization. Good corporate governance is 
therefore considered a prerequisite of constructive 
restructuring in transition economies (Crotty & Jobomem, 
2004). Following this theoretical debate, there is a dilemma as to 
whether the transfer of corporate governance models from 
developed market economies has been adequate to address 
problems such as ‘dominance of internal insiders, owners / 
owners of large blocks and weak institutions ‘or there should 
have been developed models that protect the interests of 
smaller owners and other interested actors, especially workers.  
In the 2000s, at the beginning of this century, there was also a 
discussion about the contextualism of corporate governance 
models, often considered as influenced by the so-called 
Washingtonian post-consensus, which considered the problems 
that were caused by the unqualified implementation of so-
called shock therapy (Crotty & Jobomem, 2004). So it was a 
suggestion to go beyond the ‘Shareholder / Owner-Agency 
model, taking into account the specific conditions of certain 
countries regarding the institutional, proprietary and business 
aspect, including business culture. 
Thus, for example, (Berglof & Pajuste, 2002) consider that 
traditional methods of company behaviors in the owner-
manager relationship in many Central and Eastern European 
countries were unsuccessful in the conditions of new and 
owners (large block- holders). This also applies to the way of 
winning tenders. Therefore, the models mentioned were 
ineffective as disciplinary instruments. They are therefore 
committed to strengthening external control, including closer 
co-operation between banks and the court system, stronger 
regulation and greater investor protection, including the role of 
creditors. 
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In fact, regarding the difficulties of the functioning of corporate 
governance in transition countries, the problem does not 
appear to be the codes, as they mostly reflect codes practiced in 
developed economies. These codes have also been drafted with 
Western expert’s assistance, engaged consultants. More than 
that, the problem lies in the business environment and the 
institutional context and the need for an evolution of business 
culture. An illustrative example of this is taken from the 
research conducted by the Russian Institute of Directors (RID 
2003). Since the Corporate Governance Code in Russia was 
prepared with a qualified assistance (OECD and World Bank) 
and in the framework of a stakeholder and consultant process 
with interested corporations and stakeholders and it was 
approved in 2001, the RID made a survey to see the level of 
implementation in 2003.  
While about 90% of companies have implemented the Code 
in the parts pertaining to the establishment of Boards and 
Bodies the same does not occur in other sections. Only 5% of 
them provide information on the implementation of standards 
for the board structure, only 15% regarding the remuneration 
standards and audit committees. On average these corporations 
make transparent only 7 of the 35 recommended issues 
(Fideorczuk, 2017). 
Hence, the corporate governance codes even transition 
economies look very good on paper but have not had any 
significant influence on government practices. Another issue is 
the fact that in the situations when former state-owned 
companies were privatized by former directors and managers, 
the system based on the ‘principal-agency report does not seem 
to be adequate It turns out that managers are protected from 
themselves (Crotty & Jobomem, 2004).  
 
 
Some Corporate Governance specifications in economies in transition 
                                                                                                  Thesis, no.1, 2018     97 
Short comparison overview 
 
Looking at developments related to corporate governance in 
transition economies along Kosovo, we will also provide a brief 
overview for Bulgaria, Croatia, and Albania. 
Croatia and Bulgaria as EU members now have a transition 
history that more or less supports context. Bulgaria faced with a 
very fierce transition in its own beginnings, similar to Albania 
in its early years, underwent a rapid structural reform based on 
the framework of a faster EU integration process. 
Meanwhile, Croatia with more features of a Central 
European country, but distinct from the war, had a longer 
progression to the EU integration process. In a way, the 
transition to this economy can be called rounded-up on 
essential issues with their integration into the EU. These 
countries have adopted practices in their legislation under 
European directives on corporate governance. In Albania and 
Kosovo, there is still a long transition, with similar problems, 
but in a very different political context. The data were obtained 
from secondary sources, mainly from the European Bank for 
Research and Development (EBRD) Report for Croatia and 
Bulgaria, and from other sources for Albania and especially for 
Kosovo. For the last one, additional data were obtained from 
two surveys, one conducted by the Riinvest Institute and the 
other by the author for the exclusive needs of this work. Based 
on this, we will draw a comparison between these countries 
based on the EBRD (Country Assessment Report 2017) 
estimates, linking this with some essential features from the 
studies of international business organizations. Meanwhile, for 
Albania and Kosovo, we will see a deeper comparison based on 
my studies and other sources. 
In this paper, I will present a brief comparative analysis of 
corporate governance in Kosovo, Croatia, Bulgaria, and 
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Albania. First, I will make a comparison of EBRD estimates for 
corporate governance based on Country Reports (2017) for 
these countries by linking the assessment results to several 
business environment ratings published by credible 
international organizations. Such a comparison seems more 
consistent as EBRD has used the same approach to assessing 
the development of corporate governance for all countries. 
Research data, more specifically surveys for Albania and 
Kosovo are difficult to compare taking into account the 
different objectives of these studies, then samples and 
questionnaires. However, a general line of some phenomena 
can also be drawn from these studies. 
The methodology used by the EBRD for assessing the level 
of Corporate Governance in its member countries consists in 
assessing the legal and institutional framework and its 
implementation by comparing it with best practices (OECD 
Principles, Financial Institutions, in particular, International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), EBRD and World Bank). The 
methodology used is identical in each country (EBRD, 2017). 
This study uses five areas to assess the framework and practices 
of corporate governance where a summary assessment is 
provided on these aspects: 
(1) Structure and operation boards 
(2) Transparency and Disclosure (Publication) 
(3) Internal control 
(4) Shareholders Rights  
(5) Stakeholders (stakeholders) and institutions 
Each of these fields is divided into constituent elements which 
are numerically 1-5 evaluated and correspond to the qualitative 
estimates of 5 good and very well (darker green colors), good 
average 4 (lighter green color) correct 3 (yellow color), weak 2 
(orange color) and 1 very poor (red color). For example, the 
assessment of ‘Board structure and functioning consists of the 
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following elements: Composition, Gender Diversity, 
Independent Directors (s), Effectiveness and Responsibility of 
the Board. Estimates were made on the basis of questionnaires 
answered by lawyers, regulators, auditors, large and listed 
companies and stock exchanges. Questionnaires were then 
evaluated by EBRD experts in corporate governance and then 
textual reports and 15-20 page graphs for EBRD member 
countries were compiled. Below we give the summary table 
without further stopping in the methodological explanations 
that can be found in the EBRD (EBRD, 2017). 
 
Table 1: 
 
 
Source: Corporate Governance Sector Assessment, EBRD, 2017. 
 
A joint characteristic of this assessment is that the four 
countries are positioned the worst in the structure and 
functioning of the boards and this is related to the diversity 
with the presence of independent experts and the performance 
evaluation. Also, for Bulgaria, Albania, and Kosovo the internal 
audit control and assessment of stakeholders and the role of 
institutions is not positive. 
It is clear that Croatia has made significant progress, with 
certain problems in the structure and functioning of boards and 
internal control. Bulgaria, though earlier integrated into the EU, 
is standing behind. Overall, Croatia, in spite of the later EU 
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integration, has had a more mature institutional structure, a 
stronger tradition of corporate organization, and in general, it 
has been increasingly close to Central Europe in many more 
aspects than Bulgaria. Albania and Kosovo have a similar 
rating, with a better rating for transparency in Kosovo and for 
shareholder rights in Albania. 
 
Table 2:  
  
Source: *World Bank, 2017, ** Transparency International, 2017, 
***Meduza, L., 2017, ****Riinvest 2012, 2015 
 
As demonstrated above with theoretical discussions, the 
fundamental problem of corporate governance in transition 
economies, particularly in Eastern and Southeast Europe does 
not lie in the legal framework, but in general the strengthening 
of law enforcement institutions, with free competition, fighting 
of informality and corruption. 
The data presented in the table above are also in line with 
these findings. Croatia is well ranked here, followed by 
Bulgaria which with some indicators is closer to Albania and 
Kosovo. Kosovo and Albania rank the worst with very few 
differences. Kosovo has made a big leap in index and ranking at 
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Doing Business in 2017. A year ago, it was placed in the 60th 
place, similar to Albania.  
How much can we have a mutual influence between the 
level of corporate governance and ranking in certain areas 
should be explored more deeply, but it is evident that at this 
level the ranking also affects the level of corporate governance, 
as well as the situation in the areas for which the raking was 
made greatly influences developments in corporate governance 
in certain countries. 
If we draw a comparable parallel between Albania and 
Kosovo based on the studies of. (Cipi, 2014) and (Diber, 2014) in 
Albania and Riinvest (2015) and (Mustafa, 2018) on Kosovo as 
well as EBRD estimates for both countries the following 
conclusions could be drawn: 
• The legal framework with certain exceptions to the 
CEO's choice (in Albania) and the rights of small 
shareholders in Kosovo meets the OECD standards, 
but there are serious problems in their 
implementation. 
• The EBRD assessment is similar to Kosovo and 
Albania, with a nuanced distinction where Kosovo 
gains an advantage over transparency and internal 
control, while Albania is better off on the rights of 
shareholders. With other elements the assessment is 
similar; 
• There are similarities to the size of Boards, but 
according to the studies cited above, Albania is in a 
better situation in the nomination of the Board 
independent members as well as with the CEO election 
from the Board. However, in both countries, there are 
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no procedures, criteria, and practices built for 
performance appraisal by CEOs; 
• Both countries need to understand the importance of 
corporate governance in the first instance for its own 
corporations, but also for the health of national 
economies, as long as there are no enforceable 
mechanisms for implementing the OECD Principles, 
apart from the elements of these principles which are 
included in the Laws. 
• The conclusion is that, except the banking sector, the 
application of the standard corporate governance 
principles under the OECD and other relevant 
institutions is in the early stages of development in 
both countries. 
• It has been identified that in both countries, there is a 
great negative influence of government and political 
institutions, especially in public enterprises, but this 
also applies in general to the role of institutions in 
supporting and promoting good governance, law 
enforcement, transparency and accountability which 
must significantly improve; 
 
Conclusions 
 
The difficulties of the functioning of corporate governance in 
transition countries seem to be the problem, not in the codes, as 
they mostly reflect practice codes in developed economies. 
They have also been drafted with the assistance of experts from 
Western and engaged consultants. More than that, the problem 
lies in the business environment and the institutional context 
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and the need for an evolution of business culture. The 
traditional approaches of the company behavior related to 
‘owner-manager rapport in the environment of many Central 
and Eastern European countries were unsuccessful in the 
conditions of large block holders. This also applies to the 
manner of winning tenders. Therefore, the models mentioned 
were ineffective as instruments for disciplining the managers. 
The solution seems to be to strengthen external control, 
including closer co-operation between banks and the court 
system, stronger regulation and greater investor protection, 
including the role of creditors. 
The short comparative analysis of developments in corporate 
governance in Croatia, Bulgaria, Albania and Kosovo reveals 
that one of the main factors in developing a meaningful 
framework for corporate governance and its implementation is 
the level of institutional maturity as well as institutions ability 
and readiness of law enforcement and law and market equal 
opportunity for all involved parties. 
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